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LEGAL ASPECTS OF
HUMAN GENETICS
Roger B. Dworkin
Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington, Indiana 47405

Gilbert S. Omenn
School of Public Health and Community Medicine, University of Washington, Seattle,
Washington 98195

INTRODUCTION
Knowledge of human genetics , the relative prevalence of genetic disease, and
clinical genetic services have increased dramatically in recent years. Many of
the 3-5% of newborns with significant congenital anomalies have conditions
that are genetic. The proportion of infant deaths from genetic causes is estimated to have risen from 7% in 1915 to about 20% today , largelj'.because·ofthe
reduction of infant deaths from other causes. Genetic disorders are major
causes of death in the 1-4 year age group. Twenty-five to 30% of under
18-year-old and perhaps 13% of adult acute care hospital admissions are for
genetic or genetically influenced conditions (53, 78, pp. 803-4).
As genetic disease has increased in importance , so too have methods for
dealing with it. Genetic screening , genetic counseling , prenatal diagnosis, new
reproductive technologies , conventional therapies , and potentially even gene
therapy offer hope and information to an ever-increasing number of families.
With increased knowledge and increased hope, however, come increased
responsibilities, occasional disappointments, and ethical dilemmas (52a, 57).
Disappointed persons may seek to use the law to establish responsibilities and
to obtain compensation. Similarly, disputes over ethical and moral values may
be transformed into legal actions.
In this chapter we examine some of the legal issues posed by new develop
ments in human genetics and make some tentative observations about where the
law may be headed. The law of human genetics is very new and largely
107
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undeveloped. Therefore, any conclusions expressed here are highly specula
tive. Also, the law varies from state to state. Persons with specific questions
should consult an attorney in their own jurisdiction.
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ADVANCES IN GENETIC SERVICES
Clinical genetics has blossomed as a field of medicine during the past 20 years
as a result of remarkable scientific progress and numerous practical applica
tions of genetic principles in diagnosis, treatment, and counseling of patients
and their families (75a, 80). More than any other field except perhaps infec
tious diseases and traumatic injury, genetics bridges clinical medicine and
public health ( 16a, 57, 60a). The individual patient is almost always considered
part of the larger unit of the family or broader community. Genetic disorders are
no longer viewed as rare and exotic , untreatable and inevitable. A much more
activist approach to at least some of these diseases is feasible now, and
treatments drawn from the full array of the medical and surgical armamentar
ium have been applied. Many treatments depend on knowledge of the biochem
istry or enzymology of the disease; others involve surgery in circumstances of
early diagnosis; still others utilize manipUlation of the diet or manipulation of
the immune response (53a).
Against this background, the relatively simple procedure of amniocentesis
has revolutionized the practice of clinical genetics and genetic counseling and
enhanced interest in genetic screening (53b). With this procedure to sample
fetal cells from the amniotic fluid, specific tests of chromosomes , DNA,
enzymes , and other proteins can be applied to pregnant women at "high risk" of
delivering infants with certain birth defects or other genetic disorders. Pre
viously, the physician could offer only statistical estimates of the likelihood of
occurrence or recurrence of these disorders; now prospective parents can learn
whether the fetus is affected or not affected. It must always be emphasized,
however, that these tests cannot guarantee a "normal" baby, since there are
many disorders for which no tests are available.
Amniocentesis should be performed by a skilled obstetrician only after the
patient (couple) has received appropriate genetic counseling and has given
informed consent. The safety and efficacy of this procedure were studied
intensively as the technique was being introduced, a model of technology
assessment in medicine. The timing, at 14-17 weeks of pregnancy , is deter
mined by the time of appearance and accumulation of sufficient amniotic fluid.
Chromosomal or biochemical studies generally require about 3 weeks to
complete in the laboratory, so the couple must wait until the seventeenth to
twentieth week of pregnancy to learn the results. Major indications for mid
trimester amniocentesis are listed in Table 1.

LEGAL ASPECTS OF GENETICS
Table 1
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Indications for midtrimester amniocentesis

Cytogenetic studies on cultured amniotic fluid cells
Mother's age> 35
Previous child with Down syndrome
Family history or carrier status for chromosomal disorder
Determination of sex in X-linked disorders
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Biochemical studies on amniotic fluid
Previous child with neural tube closure defect
Linkage study for myotonic dystrophy
Enzymatic analyses on cultured amniotic fluid cells
Previous child with testable inborn error of metabolism
Couple at risk for Tay-Sachs disease, detected by population screening
Gene studies on cultured amniotic fluid cells
Couple at risk for

(X -thalassemia

The complexities that arise with new tests can be illustrated with the alpha
fetoprotein (AFP) test for detection of neural tube closure defects (open spine,
spina bifida, anencephaly). AFP is a normal plasma protein that is thought to
"leak" into the amniotic fluid through neural tube defects. Some crosses into
the maternal circulation. Instead of a qualitative change in chromosome pattern
(such as trisomy 2 1 in Down syndrome), this disorder presents with a quantita
tive increase in measurable AFP in amniotic fluid and in maternal serum.
Testing for increased AFP was rapidly accepted for prenatal diagnosis of
fetuses in families with a previous , severely affected child (recurrence risk
about 4%). However, there was a question of whether to do this test when
amniocentesis was indicated to rule out Down syndrome or some other specific
testable disorder. The fluid was already available, so it seemed desirable to add
this inexpensive test. Since the general population incidence is only 0 . 2% ,
there i s a problem with false positives and false negatives, a s i n most quantita
tive assays, and the normal range is influenced by gestational age and several
other factors. Should a test be performed that the parents did not seek?
It was soon recognized that the appearance of AFP in maternal serum could
be monitored as a means of screening to detect high-risk pregnancies before the
couple ever had experienced the birth of an affected child. From a public health
point of view, this screening approach is far more effective in reducing the
incidence of neural tube defects than is waiting until a case has occurred in a
family before beginning to test. Like all other screening tests, the population
incidence, the specificity and sensitivity of the test, and the scheme for
confirmation and management of the cases become crucial; these matters have
been discussed in a previous volume of the Annual Review ofPublic Health by
Holtzman et al (39b). Maternal serum screening for AFP has been introduced as
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a routine part of obstetric care in the United Kingdom, but its introduction in the
United States was delayed and has been rejected because of the lower popula
tion incidence and attendant higher proportion of false positives and because of
the lack of organized public health service networks in this country. An
additional twist in this case was the tortuous path for FDA approval of a test kit
for AFP. Obstetricians opposed approval for fear of liability should the tests not
be done or should tests be interpreted inappropriately; pediatricians and clinical
geneticists insisted that approval should be tied to requirements for genetic
counseling and follow-up; but organized medicine (the AMA) objected to the
FDA's efforts to respond to these positions by placing certain constraints on
this aspect of the practice of medicine! A test kit was finally approved, with
instructions that testing be closely tied to genetic services.
Another eye-catching indication for amniocentesis in Table I is the deter
mination of sex. This is a simple matter, since male and female fetal cells differ
in their chromosome complement (46,XY for males; 46 ,XX for females). At
present, amniocentesis followed by chromosome analysis for sex is used only
in the very specific circumstances of X-linked recessive disorders of which the
mother is known or thought to be a carrier and for which no biochemical test is
available . The parents seek such testing in order to learn whether the fetus is
female, indicating a daughter who will be unaffected (either genotypically
normal or a carrier, like the mother) , or a male. They will have already decided
to consider terminating the pregnancy of a male fetus , despite the fact that they
cannot know whether that fetus is affected or entirely normal. Examples of
diseases for which this indication applies are Duchenne muscular dystrophy,
hemophilia, and Lesch-Nyhan disease. Obviously the same testing could be
applied to pregnancies by couples simply wanting to know the sex of the baby
or wanting to terminate a pregnancy of undesired sex, either male or female. A
few such requests have been experienced at most genetic counseling centers
around the country, but most inquirers desist when they are informed that the
test cannot be performed until well after the mother experiences "kicking" by
the baby and that results would not be available until 18-20 weeks of pregnan
cy. The use of ultrasound visualization of the fetus , essential for fetoscopy and
helpful in amniocentesis, vividly demonstrates the viability of the fetus and
may well accelerate maternal/fetal bonding.
Thus , the late timing of amniocentesis helps assure that only serious prob
lems will be addressed with this procedure, even though it would be desirable in
many cases to be able to help the couple with information as early as possible in
the pregnancy, whether they go ahead with the pregnancy (the vast majority,
given the high odds of reassuring test results) or not. There is no question that
the overriding social and political issue facing prenatal diagnosis is the con
troversy over abortion . Some parents who find abortion unacceptable in other
circumstances choose to terminate a pregnancy in which the fetus is proved to
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have a severe birth defect. Some couples are willing to have additional children
only with the assurance that such testing is available. Others seek prenatal
diagnosis, even though their personal and religious views preclude termination
of the pregnancy , in order to prepare for the birth of an affected child with
special needs.
First trimester testing is now becoming feasible with a procedure known as
chorionic villus biopsy. A variety of techniques for chorionic villus sampling
(CYS) has been reported from China, USSR, France, UK, Italy, and the US
(8a, 59a, 64a). A CVS Newsletter in conjunction with the Hereditary Diseases
Section of the World Health Organization (WHO) shows a high level of
international interest, since this procedure can be carried out on unanesthetized
outpatients, offers information early in the first trimester, may be applicable for
major disorders in developing countries (such as thalassemias and sickle cell
disease) , and may find greater social and legal acceptance than has amniocente
sis in certain European countries (64a). Ironically, development of these
techniques was delayed a decade when systematic studies demonstrated the
safety and efficacy of amniocentesis.
In brief, chorionic villus sampling involves insertion of an endoscope
through the vagina and uterine cervix to permit needle aspiration of villi from
either the implantation site (chorion frondosum) or the extraplacental chorion
(which will degenerate). A successful biopsy yields fetal tissue uncontaminated
with maternal cells and with minimal risks . The expcnsive aspect of the
technique is the use of real-time ultrasound to identify the implantation site and
to guide the endoscope. The risk of damage to the placenta can be avoided by
sampling the degenerating extraplacental chorion, but that tissue may give
unreliable results. The risk of increasing the "normal" rate of spontaneous
miscarriage must be considered and investigated; preliminary results are quite
encouraging, though there are sometimes technical difficulties in negotiating
the cervical canal and reaching the chorion frondosum. Great care must be
exercised to rule out maternal contamination from the passage through the
endocervical canal. The optimal time for sampling appears to be 9-10 weeks of
pregnancy (from the last menstrual period). Extensive investigation will be
necessary to demonstrate for which enzymes these biopsy specimens reflect the
characteristics of cells tested in midtrimester or after birth. Some diagnoses will
be feasible by detecting mutations of polymorphic markers in the DNA itself.
Chorionic villus biopsy offers the advantages of direct biochemical chromo
somal analyses without the time-consuming cell culture step required for
amniotic fluid.
As this technique comes into wide use (about 1000 pregnancies tested
worldwide as of April 1984), public demand for this service may grow rapidly,
far exceeding amniocentesis demand. The likelihood of use for determination
of fetal sex will be greater. The diffusion of the technique to obstetricians
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unassociated with counseling centers may increase the risk of misunderstand
ings and subsequent litigation.
These techniques for prenatal diagnosis will be essential for intrauterine
therapies that are being developed. Rare vitamin-responsive inborn errors of
metabolism may be treated by administration of large doses of vitamin to the
mother; oral cyanocobalamin (B u) was used to treat methylmalonic aciduria in
this way (53b). Surgery on the fetus is becoming frequent, especially for
congenital defects affecting the urinary tract. The direct tie to first trimester
genetic diagnoses, however, may come with further advances in the introduc
tion of specific genes. Candidates are those for adenosine deaminase and purine
nucleoside phosphorylase (deficiencies cause immune deficiency), hypoxan
thine-guanine phosphoribosyl transferase (deficiency causes the Lesch-Nyhan
syndrome of ment?} retardation, self-destructive behavior, and gout), and
citrullinemia and other blocks in ammonia metabolism (which cause mental
retardation) . These genes have been cloned; they may function without the
precise intracellular regulation that should be required for the globin genes
(sickle cell disease, thalassemia) or immunoglobulin genes; and retroviruses
may be useful carriers (46a). The problems lie in finding suitable means of

introducing the genes to target tissues, means of assuring their expression at
adequate levels, and criteria for determining when and how to begin such
experiments with human beings ( l a, 58).

GENETIC MALPRACTICE
Persons disappointed with the outcome of genetic screening or genetic counsel
ing may seek compensation by bringing a malpractice suit against those they
believe are responsible.
The law of malpractice, including genetic malpractice, is part of the law of
torts. Stated oversimply , tort law has two primary goals: the reduction of the

likelihood of harm in society and minimization of the impact of those harms
that do occur. Behaviorally, the law assumes that the risk of liability will
encourage safe behavior. Economically, it assumes that losses are less devas
tating if distributed, for example, from the patient who is injured, through a
doctor and an insurance company, to the company's policy holders (other
doctors), and eventually to all patients in the form of increased health care
costs, than if left to be borne entirely by the injured patient.
Since avoidance and allocation of losses are the primary goals, the first legal
questions to ask in a medical genetic context are: what are losses, who may
suffer them, and how much are they worth .

Claimants and Injuries
Six types of persons may plausibly be expected to assert claims in the genetic
disease context:
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1. A patient whose own care could have been improved by a correct
diagnosis or provision of adequate, accurate information. Such a patient's
injuries give rise only to the same kinds of evaluation questions that arise in any
case of misdiagnosis or misinformation . They are not affected by the genetic
nature of the disease and will not be discussed further here.
2 . Parents who abort a healthy child because they received erroneous or no
genetic information or prenatal diagnosis. These claimants have obviously
been injured. They are unlikely to receive substantial compensation, because
'
the law has taken a very restrictive position on compensation for the death of
unborn children ( 1 , 48); however, the law is becoming less restrictive in this
regard . If a practitioner were consciously to adopt a policy of erring on the side
of encouraging abortion by overstating risks , substantial liability , including
punitive damages , likely would be imposed.
3. Parents who bear an affected child because they received erroneous or no
genetic information or prenatal diagnosis. These are the most likely claimants.
Liability to them may be substantial. These parents will claim both economic
and emotional loss from the preventable birth of an affected child. Economic
loss includes the full range of special medical , custodial , and training costs the
child may require over a lifetime (4, 62, 66, 67).
Emotional distress damages raise a harder question. Some courts allow
recovery because of the clear legitimacy of the parents' claim and the fore
seeability of the emotional suffering that negligent genetic counseling that leads
to the birth of an affected child will cause (5). Others deny compensation
because of the difficulty of measuring emotional loss in financial terms and a
fear of faking (4 1). The view that results in compensation seems likely ulti
mately to prevail. The opposite approach is rooted in old doctrine that de
veloped in nonmedical contexts. It is out of step with modem tendencies to
provide fuller compensation to injured persons and to recognize the legitimacy
of protecting interests beyond the merely physical.
A fair prediction seems to be that parents who would have refrained from
conceiving or who would have aborted an affected fetus if given correct
information, but who conceived or did not abort because of negligent failure to
provide information or the negligent provision of incorrect information, will be
permitted to recover both their economic losses and compensation for their
emotional distress.
4. Siblings of an affected child. Siblings may claim that the birth of an
affected child into the family deprived them of their fair share of parental
attention and money. Such claims are probably not compensable ( 17), except
perhaps in California (22).
5. The affected child. Acting through a guardian , an affected child may sue
for "wrongful life," alleging that he would have been better off never to have
been born than to have been born in his actual condition (63a). Until 1982, this
claim was rejected every place it was litigated (4, 25, 27 , 30). Courts generally
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reject the claim because damages are too difficult to measure, as they cannot
compare the monetary value of an injured life with the void of nonexistence ,
and because of the view that life is always better than nonlife . Neither of these
arguments seems persuasive . Courts have long awarded damages for un
measurable injuries, such as pain and suffering; nothing prevents them from
doing so here. And a preference for life at any cost is hardly consistent with
recent developments favoring a patient's "right to die" in some circumstances,
which has been gaining considerable judicial (50, 56, 68) and legislative ( la ,
56) support nationwide.
Nonetheless , in at least one type of case a good reason to deny recovery to the
child may exist. If the child's condition is one that will cause him to die early in
life, the practical effect of compensating the child is to compensate his estate ,
which, of course, will be his parents. Since the parents have their own claim to
compensation for their injuries, such a result would constitute a windfall to
them. Moreover, by requiring compensation when no independent loss exists to
compensate, this result would unnaturally inflate the costs of medical care . The
system strives to make each activity pay its true costs, not to distort the market
by imposing additional ones.
Three states, California (71), Washington (37), and New Jersey (58a), have
now recognized a child's claim for wrongful life , but each state has been careful
to avoid multiple recoveries and to limit the size of awards. The courts only
awarded the children actual economic losses for care and training . They denied
claims for so-called "general damages" to compensate a child for pain , suffer
ing, loss of dignity , etc; and they specifically limited out-of-pocket awards to
either the child or the parents , not both. Thus, the California, Washington, and
New Jersey cases have only a slight practical impact. They provide financial
care for the child regardless of the availability of the parents, and go no farther.
Logically, however, no sound basis exists to deny general damages once the
legitimacy of the child's claim has been recognized. Therefore , a future court is
likely to permit such an award , dramatically increasing potential liability .
However circumscribed the damage award may be , if the wrongful life cause
of action is recognized, many questions about it remain unresolved. First, how
severe must the child's defect be to permit compensation? The three cases to
date have involved hereditary deafness, fetal hydantoin syndrome , and con
genital rubella syndrome. What else will qualify? Four possible answers , none
of which is acceptable, present themselves:

(a) The child will only be compensated if its condition is so bad that life is
worse than no life . Courts will be loathe to make such assessments, and the
cases already decided show that some other standard is being applied. Few
would consider deafness a fate worse than death.
(b) The child will only be compensated if its condition is so bad that its mother
would have obtained an abortion had she been properly informed . This test
is unacceptable because it gives mothers an incentive to lie and allows a
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child's claim to be determined by his mother's religious and moral views
and her perception of a particular anomaly.
(c) The child will only be compensated if its condition is so bad that a
reasonable mother would have obtained an abortion if she had been proper
ly informed. This is really only the first approach stated differently. No
court can say which conditions require a reasonable mother to abort.
(d) Any child will be compensated for any unusual medical or educational
expense that proper genetic counseling and prenatal diagnosis could have
avoided. This approach will lead to uncontrollable, unpredictable recover
ies for countless trivial imperfections. It is unworkable.
The courts have not yet begun to grapple with this question of how severe a
child's condition must be before the child can be compensated.
A second question posed by the recognition of a claim for wrongful life is
whether the child has such a claim against anyone other than the involved
medical personnel. Specifically, may the child recover from his parents for
being born with a defect (5 1, 63)? An intermediate appellate court in California
answered that question in the affirmative (2 1). That case involved alleged
negligence by a medical laboratory , which performed Tay Sachs testing. The
court went out of its way to observe that if a case should arise in which all
medical personnel performed properly , but the parents nonetheless chose to
bear an affected child, the parents should have to compensate the child for the
injury they caused it. This suggestion was rejected promptly by the California
legislature (9). It seems inconsistent with notions of free choice in reproductive
decision making (59), implies an obligation to obtain an abortion, and raises the
spectre of extraordinary involvement in women's lifestyle decisions. No other
court seems likely to adopt such an extreme position.
Nevertheless, some courts have imposed obligations on mothers to their
unborn children (34, 45, 5 1, 63), and in some circumstances such obligations
may be appropriate. For example, some persons may think it appropriate to
impose liability on a mother with PKU who causes brain damage to her child by
refusing to follow the low-phenylalanine diet during pregnancy. Thus, the
question of parental obligations to unborn children is not yet fully resolved.
6. Relatives (and potential relatives) of patients. These persons may seek
compensation for the failure of someone in the genetic counseling process to
inform them of risks the counselor learned about from evaluating a patient .
These claims raise questions about sharing information, and we discuss them in
that context below.

Negligence
Whoever the claimant is, the genetic counselor or other defendant will only be
liable to him if the defendant was negligent. What constitutes negligence in the
genetic disease context is by no means clear.
Negligence means unreasonably dangerous conduct. What is reasonable for
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doctors practicing medicine is usually, but not always, measured by the
ordinary behavior of other members of the same specialty, traditionally in the
same or a similar community as the defendant (28 , 65), but increasingly in the
nation as a whole (64). Different standards are applied to different specialists
(8). In the genetic disease area one would expect the highest standards to be
imposed upon persons who claim expertise in medical genetics . Obstetricians,
pediatricians, family practitioners, and others who deal often with genetic
disease are also likely to be held to high standards of performance.
Unfortunately, specific answers to questions about what may constitute
genetic negligence cannot be provided in advance. Case law to date provides no
answers. Some cases, such as failure to take care properly to label laboratory
samples, are clear examples of negligence. Most cases are not so easy .
Perhaps the most relevant questions are, how much genetic information must
one know, and how forthcoming with that information must one be. As to the
former, one clearly must know what others in the field know, so that as
knowledge of genetic diseases increases, more and more physicians will be
responsible for knowing more and more about them. One must also know what
one claims to know. If a patient asks a question and the doctor answers it, the
doctor is responsible for the accuracy of the answer (4). Finally, sometimes a
doctor will be expected to know that he lacks sufficient expertise properly to
handle the patient's case. In such a situation the doctor must seek consultation
or refer the patient to an appropriate person.
The law does not reveal when a physician must raise a genetic issue with a
family and when he may wait to be asked. Physicians probably have a duty to
inform pregnant women over 35 of the increased risk of Down syndrome and of
the availability of prenatal diagnosis for it. As to other conditions and tech
niques, all that can be said is that the law increasingly emphasizes full patient
information and freedom of choice (11, 14, 79); this suggests that the prudent
course for a doctor to follow is to overinform rather than underinform his
patients.
Negligence law in general and malpractice law in particular are moving
toward ever easier imposition of liability. This trend toward easier tort recovery
coupled with the rapid expansion of medical genetic know ledge and techniques
suggest that substantial liability for genetic malpractice is likely. Maximizing
one's own education and taking care to engage in serious genetic history taking,
screening, diagnosis, and referral will reduce the risk of liability by reducing
the risk of error. As long as the courts continue to pursue loss distribution
policies , however, no amount of care can guarantee immunity from liability.

SHARING GENETIC INFORMATION
Some of the most difficult problems posed by genetic medicine involve the
sharing of genetic information with the patient and others . Genetic diagnostic
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techniques often reveal sensitive information that the counselor may prefer to
keep from the patient. For example, diagnostic procedures may reveal that a
married woman's husband is not the father of her child, that a male fetus or
baby has an XYY chromosome configuration, or that a healthy fetus is of a sex
the parents do not prefer. Must the counselor disclose this information to the
patient (57)?
Surprisingly little law exists about patients' access to their own medical
records. The usual view is that the physician owns the records themselves, but
that the patient will be granted access to the information in the records, at least
if he has a medical reason for wanting it (32, 52). These standard rules are of
little help in the genetic counseling context.
For diagnosis to reveal nonpaternity the husband and wife must both have
been evaluated, and both may have sought counseling services. Which one is
the patient? To whom does access to information belong? Answers to these
questions can only be sought through analysis of the probable consequences of
different courses of action.
If the counselor withholds the information, lies, or makes up an implausible
story (for example, that the baby carries a new mutation), and the husband
eventually learns the truth, he may have a valid claim against the counselor for
the costs of raising the child, emotional distress , and punitive damages. In
some states , however, an irrebutable legal presumption that a child born to a
married woman is legitimate may preclude recovery . Conversely, if the coun
selor does reveal the information, the mother's claims for invasion of privacy or
intentional infliction of emotional distress will be weak because legal require
ments of pUblicity in the privacy case and extreme and outrageous conduct in
the emotional distress case cannot be met. Thus, telling the husband the truth is
probably safer than withholding the information. This is consistent with con
ventional ethical norms about truth telling and with judicial preferences both
for honesty and for full disclosure of information.
The XYY and fetal sex problems are also difficult. In the XYY setting a
counselor may be reluctant to disclose information of ambiguous significance,
which might lead either to an abortion or to a self-fulfilling prophecy of
criminality. In the fetal sex case the counselor may not wish to facilitate
abortion for sex choice. It seems clear that the XYY information must be
disclosed. Its very ambiguity is what makes it essential to allow the patient to
choose her course of action . The pregnant patient has a medical choice about
abortion to make; the mother has choices about education and care for her son.
The doctor may not make the choices for her by denying her the information she
needs to make them.
The same seems true with regard to fetal sex. A woman's reason for seeking
an abortion is irrelevant to her constitutional rights (59). No doctor or hospital
has to perform amniocentesis for sex choice or to make its facilities available
for abortions (55). However, if an amniocentesis has been performed, the
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doctor's preference cannot deprive a woman of her full range of legal choices.
Moreover, a legal rule that permitted fetal sex information to be withheld from
women who revealed their desire to abort a child of the undesired sex would
simply put a premium on lying, a position the law will surely try to avoid.
Genetic information may be relevant to persons in addition to patients ,
spouses , and their offspring. For example , consider a diagnosis of hemophilia,
an X-linked disease, that reveals the patient's mother to be a carrier of the gene
for hemophilia. This means that each of the mother's sisters may have a 50%
change of being a carrier, too. If a woman is a carrier, each of her sons has a
50% chance of having hemophilia. May or must a genetic counselor attempt to
locate and inform the sisters so that they may decide whether to seek amniocen
tesis and to abort male fetuses? If the counselor does not know the carrier status
of his patient's mother's sisters, may or must the counselor seek out and inform
their daughters (the patient's cousins , the patient's mother's nieces) that they
have a 25% chance of being a hemophilia carrier, and that if they are a carrier
each of their sons has a 50% chance of being affected ( 18, 57)?
Obviously , the ideal way to deal with these issues is to obtain consent to
contact and inform relatives . Sometimes , however, a person may be unwilling
to give such consent. In these cases, conventional legal rules seem to suggest
that the information should be retained in confidence. Fuller analysis, however,
suggests that courts will probably require reasonable efforts to disclose.
American law ordinarily imposes no obligation on a person to help a
stranger, no obligation to be a Good Samaritan (31). The law does impose an
obligation to maintain in confidence confidential information learned from a
patient (40). Thus , at first blush, the law would appear to place liability on a
genetic counselor who disclosed confidential information to a relative , and not
to impose liability on such a counselor for failing to do so. However, unless one
is governed by a specific statute that requires confidentiality (38, 44), this result
seems unlikely.
The rule that one need not become a Good Samaritan is an unattractive rule,
retained primarily for practical reasons. When the practical reasons are not
present, courts often create exceptions to the rule. Thus, the rule avoids
line-drawing problems in cases where many bystanders fail to come to an
accident victim's aid; it prevents us from stigmatizing persons whose failure to
rescue represents panic rather than amorality; and it recognizes the futility of
attempting to make sound actuarial judgements in order to provide failure-to
rescue insurance. None of these problems exists in the genetic counseling
context. One counselor or team is the obvious target for liability; time to think
and plan how to do one's job, not panic-stricken response to an emergency , is
involved; and the defendant's malpractice insurance is available to shift the
loss. Thus, the reasons for not imposing duties to aid strangers are not present
here.
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Moreover, courts impose obligations to breach confidentiality when a super
vening public interest requires the breach (40). An interest in promoting
informed decision-making, reducing genetic disease, or reducing the impact of
disease may be thought sufficiently more important than confidentiality to
"supervene. "
A notable California case suggests that the obligation in the genetic disease
context will be to inform relatives rather than to protect confidences. In
Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (70), a patient told his
psychotherapist that he intended to kill his girlfriend. After the patient made
good his threat, the psychotherapist was held liable for not taking adequate
steps to warn the victim. The court held the public interest in avoiding homicide
more important than the interest in maintaining a patient's confidences and
rejected as speculative the argument that requiring disclosure would actually
increase violence by discouraging people from seeking and cooperating in
psychiatric care.
The Tarasoffresult seems even more likely in the genetic disease context,
where fears of overpredicting violence (here genetic disease) are not present.
Moreover, one can argue that genetic counseling is by its very nature a
family-based rather than an individually-based branch of medicine. Therefore,
obligations ought to be to family members rather than only to individual
patients .
If this analysis is correct, counselors will sometimes be obligated to seek out
patients' relatives and warn them of their genetic risks. How great an effort to
locate such persons must they make?
In accordance with traditional negligence principles, physicians and other
counselors will have to make reasonable efforts to locate and warn relatives. In
the absence of previous decisions or well-established professional practices, it
is difficult to say what reasonableness requires. Obviously, searching one's
own telephone book for an unusual ethnic name is little enough to ask; combing
the four comers of the world for relatives is too much. Courts will determine
reasonableness on a case-by-case basis. The reasonableness standard also
suggests that only potentially useful information has to be conveyed. Thus, for
example , it seems unlikely that one would have to disclose the existence of an
incurable disease in a family to :i patient's asymptomatic sibling who is
childless and past child-bearing age.
All of this suggests that a counsekir's legal position in our hemophilia
examples, while unclear , is probably improved by making reasonable efforts to
locate relatives and inform them of their risks. The same principles are likely to
apply to providing information to prospective spouses . Again reasonableness is
the critical concept. In applying it courts will surely be able to distinguish
between imposing an obligation to an acknowledged fiance (likely) and seeking
out everyone the patient dates and might conceivably marry (unlikely) .
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Additional problems of sharing genetic information arise from the practice of
adoption (3, 35, 36). An adopted child or his adoptive parents may seek access
to information about the child's genetic heritage in order to make medical
decisions about the child or to permit the child to make informed reproductive
decisions. Similarly, counselors may learn that a patient had a child whom the
patient surrendered for adoption. The counselors may wish to locate the child in
order to inform him of his genetic risks. Finally , a person may embark on a
search for biological relatives in an attempt to locate potential bone marrow or
other organ donors (2, 38) .
Traditionally, adoption records have been sealed i n order to protect the
privacy of biological parents , adoptive parents, and children. As Hansen
& Omenn (35) have noted, all applicable statutes permit the records to be
opened under certain circumstances. The usual requirement, whether articu
lated in the statute or not, is a showing of good cause. A serious medical
need for the information would usually qualify as good cause unless reveal
ing the information seemed likely to do substantial harm. The likelihood
of benefit from contacting the adoptive parents of a child newly found to be at
risk for inheriting a gene for a particular disorder depends upon the clinical
features of that disorder , especially the feasibility of presymptomatic diagno
sis, the severity of the disease, and the effectiveness of treatment. The cases
that have been described involved Huntington disease, myotonic dystrophy,
Fabry disease, von Willebrand disease, and Waardenburg syndrome. In all
cases , the biological mothers requested that the genetic counseling provided
for them and their children be shared with the adoptive family. Informal
contacts through intermediaries in social agencies led to some misunderstand
ings and complications and stimulated recommendations for better procedures
under the aegis of the King County (Washington) Superior Court, Family Court
Division (53c).
Conscientious courts may work very hard to structure a remedy that will
permit a person to learn relevant information while protecting others' identities.
For example, In Application ofGeorge (2), an adopted child sought to open the
adoption record to learn his biological mother's identity for the purpose of
exploring the possibility of her becoming a bone marrow donor for him. The
appellate court in Missouri ordered the trial court to seek the biological father
and mother, to act as an intermediary , and to try to work the situation out. It
refrained from ordering disclosure of the biological parents' identities and
expressed its preference for avoiding disclosure. Cases like George suggest
that, while resort to cumbersome legal procedures is still required to provide
good genetic medical care in situations involving adoption, room for optimism
about the outcome of those procedures exists. Courts seem sensitive to the need
to protect both physical health and the psychological and social well-being to
which privacy is so important.
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ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTION TECHNOLOGIES
Genetic counseling provides patients with information about reproductive and
treatment options as well as about genetic disease and their own genetic
situations. For many married couples information about reproductive options is
especially important. Technology has now provided such couples with choices
beyond the traditional ones of (a) bearing or risking the birth of an affected
child, (b) refraining from conception, (c) sterilization, (d) abortion , and (e)
adoption. The most practical technological ways to permit low-risk reproduc
tion for couples at risk for transmitting genetic disorders are artificial insemina
tion and surrogate motherhood. The range of reproductive options includes in
vitro fertilization and embryo transfer (7a). In Israel , where use of donor sperm
and surrogate mothers is prohibited, in vitro fertilization and embryo transfer
are favored approaches for patients with mechanical causes of infertility (6 1a).
At the time of this writing , legal ramifications of the technical uncertainties and
ethical dilemmas arising from these developments were still speculative (7a,
4Ia, 47a).

ArtificiaL Insemination
Artificial insemination is a widely used and well-established reproductive
technology . Various estimates suggest that between 1000 and 20,000 babies
are born annually in the United States as a result of artificial insemination , with
current estimates running at about 6000 to 10,000 (20, 76, 77). A legal case
about artificial insemination was decided as long ago as 1921 (54) .
While traditionally artificial insemination using sperm from someone other
than the husband (often called artificial insemination by donor or AID) has been
used primarily as a way to deal with male infertility , the technique is in
creasingly seen as a useful response to genetic disease as well. If a husband and
wife both carry the gene for an autosomal recessive disease , they can reduce the
risk of having an affected child from 25% in each pregnancy to virtually zero by
using AID with sperm from a noncarrier male. Similarly , a man with an
autosomal dominant disease can spare his wife's child the 50% risk of being
affected by consenting to AID using sperm from an unaffected man.
To date, legal issues posed by AID have involved status relationships. The
earliest cases explored the question of whether a wife who consented to AID
had committed adultery (24, 49, 54, 76). This problem is no longer of much
practical significance because of the nearly universal adoption of no-fault
divorce in the United States.
Much more important are the cases exploring the relationship between the
husband and the child. The law in this regard is summarized through 1973 by
Wadlington (77) and in a New York case, In re Adoption ofAnonymous (42). lt
is brought up to date in Wadlington's newer work (76) and in recent New Jersey
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(47) and Kansas (6 1) cases. Almost all of the cases involve married couples in
which both the husband and wife consented to AID. In these cases, courts have
been reluctant squarely to hold that the children born as a result of AID are
legitimate. However, every reported case has reached the same result in the
dispute before the court that it would have reached in a case involving the
clearly legitimate offspring of the husband and wife . Thus , the husband is
obligated to pay child support, is entitled to visitation after divorce, may
prevent another man from adopting the child, etc.
These results give effect to the parties' plain intentions at the time they
agreed to AID. They treat parenthood as a social, rather than a biological
phenomenon. They serve the state's goals of providing two sources of support
and nurture for children . They protect husbands, wives , and children. And they
refrain from imposing any burden on doctors , donors, or donors' wives. They
seem so eminently sensible that one should be able to assume that they will be
followed in other states without regard to whether AID is used for genetic or
infertility reasons.
Nonetheless , uncertainty generated by the courts' reluctance to pronounce
the children legitimate and by the vagaries of case-by-case development have
led 24 legislatures to enact statutes dealing with AID (39a, 76). In addition, the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have offered a proposed uniform act on
the subject (72). All the statutes reflect the same policy goals the courts have
been pursuing. They attempt to have the husband-child relationship treated as
legitimate.
Unfortunately, the statutes are badly drafted and create more problems than
they solve. They fail to accomplish their goals, and they force courts either to
avoid their apparent implications or to violate their obvious policies (6 1). In
short, they fail to provide and may actually retard the search for comprehen
si veness and clarity .
Comprehensiveness and clarity are widely prized . One may wonder, then,
why the courts that have treated the husband-child relationship as legitimate
have been reluctant to declare it always to be so . The most probable explanation
is the courts' recognition of their own limited prescience and their desire to
retain flexibility. This self-restraint has already served them well once in the
artificial insemination context, and seems likely to be useful in at least two
additional areas .
In the New Jersey case of C.M. v. C.C. (13), a couple decided to have a
child, but not sexual intercourse(!) before they were married . As no physician
was willing to perform artificial insemination for them under these circum
stances , the couple did it themselves. During the ensuing pregnancy the
romance went out of their relationship, and the marriage did not occur. The
lawsuit was an effort by the man to gain visitation rights to the child. He
succeeded, a result which again seems sensible when viewed from the perspec
tives of social policy and honoring expectations. The court's job in awarding
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him visitation would have been much more difficult if earlier cases had
decreed, for example, that a sperm donor can never be the father of the resulting
child.
Such a statement, whether by case or statute (72), would also cause chaos in
any surrogate mother case , where it would raise the spectre of the intended
father having no rights or obligations and the husband of a married surrogate
enjoying "blessings" roughly akin to those involved in raising his wife's
illegitimate child.
Self-restraint has also left the courts free to deal creatively with another use
of AID. In California a man opened a sperm bank to collect semen from Nobel
laureates for the insemination of highly intelligent women (6). If a court
disapproves of this use of AID as a speculative tool of positive eugenics, the
easiest way to deal with it is to find on the facts of one case that a particular
Nobel laureate donor must support the resulting child . The pool of Nobel
donors will quickly dry up. Again this efficient, but moderate way to deal with
a social problem would be precluded by a clear statement that AID children are
always the legitimate children of their mother and her husband.
The remaining questions about AID that seem likely to arise in the genetic
disease context involve an additional form of genetic malpractice. Curie-Cohen
et al (20) report that potential sperm donors are subjected to very little screening
for genetic disorders. Are doctors who practice AID likely to be held liable
when, ironically , a technique used to avoid a genetic disease causes one (57,
pp. 68-70)? The responsibility for untoward outcomes in children of AID has
not yet been clarified. Licensing of sperm banks and research on the long
term storage and later use of sperm have been neglected, despite attention
to the potential problems (52a). Finally, the "rights" of widows or others to
sperm "stored" or donated years earlier by a deceased man are likely to be
contested.
As noted earlier, a physician's behavior is often evaluated by comparing it to
the behavior of other physicians engaged in the same type of practice. This is
not always the case, however. Occasionally courts simply dictate an acceptable
level of practice and hold doctors to it (39). Artificial insemination may be
practiced by so few physicians that judicial standard setting will appear attrac
tive. This seems especially likely with regard to a practice that primarily
requires history taking and testing for genetic characteristics, because courts
may be able to understand the technical information involved well enough to
feel equipped to deal with it, and because the new and rapidly changing nature
of the field makes reliance on professional custom less fruitful than it usually is .
As courts confront the question of negligence in the AID setting, they will be
attempting to balance the need to maintain a supply of donors with the need to
use only healthy men as donors. The balance will be struck with an eye toward
two social policy questions: To what extent should AID to avoid genetic disease
be encouraged; and who should bear the costs of children conceived through
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AID and born with genetic disease? We predict that courts will move in the
direction of requiring at least some screening of potential donors, perhaps
limited to known family history, known exposure to mutagens, testing for
ethnically related conditions of fairly high incidence, and age. Whether more
will be required cannot yet be determined.
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Surrogate Motherhood
Surrogate motherhood employs the same technology as artificial insemination
to overcome female instead of male infertility or to reduce the risk of genetic
disease by eliminating the wife rather than the husband from the genetic chain.
In the typical surrogate motherhood situation, a woman is artificially insemi
nated with semen provided by a married man. If the woman becomes pregnant,
she carries the baby to term and then surrenders all rights in it to the man and his
wife.
Typically, the married couple and the surrogate enter into a contract spelling
out the rights and obligations of each (7, 49a, 54a, 76). A well-drafted contract
may cover almost every eventuality from the surrogate's desire to keep the baby
to the couple's refusal to accept it, and may include provisions about the
surrogate's obligations to obtain prenatal care, eat properly, refrain from using
alcohol, tobacco, drugs, caffeine, etc, and to avoid dangerous work. Problems
may arise if the contract is oral or poorly drafted or if it fails to consider some
eventuality. Even more basic problems arise about whether a court will enforce
a surrogate motherhood contract or will find it unenforceable as against public
policy.
Very little law exists on the subject of surrogate motherhood. Kentucky trial
courts have considered some questions, but only in Michigan have cases
reached the appellate level.
The Kentucky trial court cases point in different directions. In re Baby Girl
(43) applied the presumption that a child born during marriage is the legitimate
child of its mother and her husband and refused to allow a married woman who
had served as a surrogate mother under a contract to terminate her parental
rights. On the other hand, in Kentucky v. Surrogate Parenting Associates. Inc.
(46), the court found no prohibition in Kentucky law of the payment of a fee for
adoption or termination of parental rights. Howcver, the court observed that, in
accordance with a Kentucky statute, any agreement by the surrogate to termi
nate her parental rights is not binding unless made at least five days after the
child's birth. Thus, a promise to surrender rights in the child made at the time of
the original surrogate motherhood agreement would not be enforceable.
Trial court decisions are not binding on courts deciding later cases. Only
appellate decisions are authoritative in that sense. Michigan is the only state
whose appellate courts have considered surrogate motherhood issues. In Doe v.
Attorney General (23) and Syrkowski v. Appleyard (69), Michigan courts have
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refused to allow the adoption code, the Paternity Act, and the artificial insemi
nation statute to be used to effect the transfer of parental rights from a surrogate
mother to the child's biological father and his wife.
Thus, the legal picture for persons contemplating surrogate parenthood is
unclear at best, discouraging at worst. As the Michigan cases make clear, old
statutes designed to deal with other subjects cannot comfortably be applied in
the surrogate motherhood context. Even the artificial insemination statutes are
not helpful. Indeed , to the extent that those statutes try to make AID children
the legitimate offspring of their mother and her husband, they seem to impose
obligations on the surrogate's husband, which obviously is not what the parties
had in mind. If legislatures want to deal with surrogate parenting, they will
need to draft new statutes. Should they do so?
If one believes that surrogate parenting poses problems similar to those
posed by AID, then no legislation is necessary. Courts have a great deal of
experience dealing with status relationships, they have done a good job in the
AID area, and no reason exists to think they will do less well here. Legislative
approaches have been less successful. Uncertainty is a small price to pay for the
flexibility that judicial resolution provides.
On the other hand, if one believes that surrogate motherhood is significantly
different from AID and should be regulated, then legislation is necessary
because courts deciding cases after the fact cannot control behavior nearly as
well as legislatures, which act prospectively, can.
Is surrogate motherhood significantly different from AID? One might argue
that it is because it poses two kinds of dangers that AID does not pose and that
require controlling behavior. First, unlike AID, surrogate motherhood poses
the risk of baby selling, a universally condemned practice, which, among other
things, suggests profiteering at the expense of desperate couples. In addition,
surrogate motherhood involves the surrogate for at least nine months. During
that time her behavior regarding diet, prenatal care , abortion, etc must be
controlled.
On the other hand , one might argue that surrogate motherhood is not
significantly different from AID. Semen is sold for AID use, and the difference
between selling semen and selling babies may be more rhetorical than real. In
any event, the sperm donor husband is not buying a baby; as its biological father
he already has rights and obligations to it (46). The technology used in
surrogate motherhood is the same as in AID. In surrogate motherhood, how
ever, the technology benefits women, while in AID it benefits men. Insisting
that the technology be controlled more strictly in surrogate motherhood than in
AID may be viewed as discrimination against women. And the asserted need to
control the surrogate's behavior during pregnancy is outrageously intrusive and
probably unconstitutional (59).
Obviously, what the right answer to these questions may be is unclear. Until
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the legislatures act, however, we suggest that courts should enforce surrogate
motherhood agreements. Doing so will support the honest intentions of the
parties at the time they entered into the agreement; it will assure at least healthy
children of placement in a home where they are wanted and will be cared for; it
reduces the chance for fraud and blackmail by the surrogate; it makes as little
law (and, therefore, as few mistakes) as possible; and it alerts the legislature to
what will happen if it does not act, thereby inviting the legislature to change the
situation if it wishes to do so.

APPLICATIONS OF GENETIC INFORMATION
Gene Therapy
At the present time developments in genetics are useful primarily to help
families in their reproductive decision making and to promote accurate diagno
sis in order to provide optimal treatment and training for persons with genetic
disorders. However, other applications of genetic knowledge are possible, or
may reasonably be expected to be developed.
Recently, some attention has been focused on the possibility of gene therapy,
that is, intervention to alter genes in order to cure genetic diseases in particular
patients or even in entire families ( l a, 29, 33, 58). While gene therapy is not yet
a reality, a few observations about potential legal questions may be made.
Two types of gene therapy are envisioned. Somatic gene therapy is designed
to correct a specific genetic defect in an individual without affecting the
patient's germ line. Gametic therapy, on the other hand, is designed to alter the
sperm or ova, thereby preventing the passing of a particular disease and
eliminating the disease from an entire family line.
Somatic gene therapy poses problems that do not differ qualitatively from
those posed by other experimental medical techniques. Regulations for the
protection of human subjects ( 15), including those requiring informed consent,
must be complied with and careful technology assessment should be carried
out. Persons using the new techniques will run typical risks of malpractice
liability, but the genetic nature of the therapy ought not to require any special
legal responses.
Gametic therapy is more problematic. The possibility of altering germ lines
to eliminate genetic characteristics calls to mind the discredited eugenics
movement and the subtler dangers of trying to modify humanness by designing
persons of specific physicial or mental types. Technologically we are very far
from having such capability. Nonetheless, some may feel that the potential for
abuse requires regulation or even prohibition of germ line experimentation. A
more moderate response would be to rely on traditional approaches to the
protection of human subjects, including fetuses ( 16), while recognizing that
special risks to current subjects require careful scrutiny and conservatism about
authorizing particular experiments.
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Genetic Testing in the Workplace
More realistic present issues are raised by efforts to perform genetic screening
on workers or job applicants. Of course, if a test has poor predictive value, it
should be rejected by the same criteria that should be applied to many current,
nongenetic tests, such as low back x-ray exams (58b). However, if a screening
test were available that would reveal persons who are hypersusceptible to
certain specific work hazards, such as oxidizing chemicals, numerous ques
tions would arise. May or must employers use screening procedures to warn
persons who are at risk? May or must they take steps to protect hypersusceptible
individuals from risks? Specifically, may they refrain from hiring or promot
ing, reassign, or fire such persons? At the present time none of these questions
has been answered , although a major government study ( 19) , Congressional
hearings, and legal (60) , medical (53d) , and policy (53e) analyses have been
devoted to them.
The Occupational Safety and Health Act (73) is designed to assure safe
working conditions and to protect the health of workers, even the most sus
ceptible (29a) . However, neither the Act nor the Agency acting under it has
addressed the questions of employer use of medical surveillance information or
of criteria for dealing with high risk employees. As Rothstein has noted, this
silence "leaves everyone in the dark" (60, p. 1429). Systematic studies should
be carried out with full cooperation of labor and management to demonstrate
the value of a test and the attributable risk of a trait before any such testing could
be justified (53d).
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (74) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (75) may provide some protection to persons whose employability or
employment is adversely affected by genetic screening. The Rehabilitation Act
is designed to protect otherwise qualified handicapped persons from discrimi
nation in employment by federally assisted employers. At least one case has
suggested that screening out qualified handicapped persons to avoid possible
future injury may be permissible (26, 60) . Whether a person with a genetic
predisposition to an occupational disease is handicapped is unclear. Because
the Rehabilitation Act is designed to prevent discrimination against the severely
handicapped, it may not protect persons with only slight genetic "imperfec
tions" from discrimination (60) .
An additional avenue for protection may be available under the 1964 Civil
Rights Act. That act is designed to prevent employment discrimination based
on race , color, religion, sex, or national origin. Many genetic diseases have a
significantly different prevalence in different racial groups. Therefore, genetic
testing may have the effect of reducing employment options on the basis of
race. Unintentional discrimination or discrimination against an individual
might be prohibited, even if the result of using the genetic screening test is
offset by other devices that result in proportional representation for the affected
racial group ( 12 , 60).
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CONCLUSION
The law of medical genetics is new and unformed. It provides little in the way
of guidance or predictability. However, its freshness, lack of form, and lack of
clarity provide a significant opportunity for health professionals, lawyers , and
policy makers to work together to move the law in sound directions .
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